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ABSTRACT
We question whether the use of social networks to exit unemployment matters in Cameroon. We
develop a Weibull-type duration model which allows us to address this issue in a convenient way.
Our investigations indicate that there is a strong evidence of endogeneity and sample selection
biases. We then propose a three-step procedure to deal with both problems. Our results show that
the use of social networks to exit unemployment is effective. Furthermore, we find that the hazard
monotonically increases with time. Hence, unemployment exhibits a positive duration dependence.
Moreover, we provide an analysis of factors that determine labor market participation and the use of
social networks. We find that the density of the west native population in the center of Cameroon and
religion are the only factors that determine the use of social networks. In contrast, characteristics
such as age, sex, education, association’s membership, determine labor market participation.
Key words: Job search; Cameroon; unemployment; social network; Weibull duration model; three-
step procedure.
JEL classification: C35; C36; C41; J64.
i
Contents
1. Introduction 1
2. General framework 2
3. Model for Cameroon 4
3.1. Specification and choice of instruments : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 4
3.2. Estimation methodology and Data source : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 5
4. Estimation and results 7
4.1. Descriptive statistics and stylized facts : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 7
4.2. Determinants of Job search and the use of informal contacts : : : : : : : : : : : 10
4.3. Duration of unemployment in Cameroon : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 11
5. Conclusions 14
List of Tables
1 Test for weak instruments : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 5
2 Search methods among employed and unemployed, 2001-2008 : : : : : : : : : : 8
3 Search methods among employed and unemployed by sex, 2005-2007 : : : : : : 8
4 Kaplan Meir survival an hazard functions : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 9
5 Fleming-Harrington Test for Equality of Survivor Functions : : : : : : : : : : : 9
6 Determinants of job search and use of social networks in Cameroon : : : : : : : 11
7 Weibull duration model of unemployment in Cameroon : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 13
8 Marginal effects after probit: Determinants of labor market participation : : : : : 17
9 Marginal effects after probit: Determinants of the use of informal contacts : : : : 17
ii
1. Introduction
Finding a job through informal contacts (friends and relatives) seems to be prevalent as a job search
method in the labor market. In Cameroon, from 2001 to 2008, 40% of the unemployed have used
this channel while looking for a job (35% in 2001, 43% in 2005, 28% in 2006 and 60% in 2008).1
This reinforces the old “ cliche´ ” that who you know is an important means in getting a good job
[Mouw (2003)]. Although several studies have established the importance of friends and relatives
in the job search process in developed countries [Montgomery (1991)], there is still little evidence
on its effects on unemployment duration and the probability of finding a job, at least in low income
countries. This raises the following question: do informal contacts (friends and relatives) predomi-
nate as a job search method in low income countries? In particular, does this channel matter in the
process of getting a job in Cameroon?
The literature on the use of informal contacts as a job search method is now considerable. Two
main strands of results emerge from it. The first establishes a positive effect of using friends and
relatives on employment, e.g. Granovetter (1974), Holzer (1988), Sylos Labini (2005), Patacchini
and Zenou (2008).
Granovetter (1974) addressed this issue in terms of the relationship between the process of
getting a job and contacts from survey data [a sample of Newton residents in Massachusetts (USA)].
He found that 43.5% of technical jobs were found through friends and relatives against 65.4% of
managerial jobs. Several other studies have also reported this channel as the most successful way
of exiting unemployment. The problem however, is that most of the conclusions in these studies are
drawn from descriptive statistics through survey data. Consequently, the methodology used often
fails to explain why the use of friends and relatives is more often chosen by job seekers. Holzer
(1988) attempts to answer this question. In his paper, a search model has been developed to show
how search methods choice is related to their costs and expected productiveness as well as income
(non-wage income and wage offer distributions). The empirical evidence confirmed that social
networks are more frequently used than other search methods. Furthermore, Holzer (1988) results
also indicated that this channel is more productive in generating offers and acceptances. This is
confirmed in the empirical study by Webber (2000) from Austrian data.
The drawback however, is that both Webber (2000) and the previous literature do not address the
issue related to the intensity of the job search of the employed in various methodological contexts.
The study by Sylos Labini (2005) focuses on this aspect. He concludes that the choice of checking
with friends and relatives, even in case of low intensity, could be more effective. Nevertheless, this
effectiveness could depend on the ties (weak or strong). This aspect is not taken into account in
the analysis by Sylos Labini (2005). Patacchini and Zenou (2008) analyzed the effects of strong
and weak ties on the individual probability of finding a job. From the dynamic model of Calvo´-
Armengol and Jackson (2004), they found that the individual probability of finding a job increases
with the number of strong and weak ties. More precisely, the longer the length of the ties, the lower
the effect.
Even though the previous literature appears to be highly in favor of a positive effect of the
use of informal contacts as a strategy on the probability of finding a job, it is not unanimous. A
1These statistics are provided by the surveys of the National Institute of Statistic (ECAM1 2001, EESI 2005 and EDIJ
2008).
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second literature against the effectiveness of this positive effect has emerged. The pioneers of this
strand include Addison and Portugal (2001), Cahuc and Fontaine (2002), and Calvo´-Armengol and
Jackson (2004). Addison and Portugal (2001) investigated the effects of job search methods on the
escape rate from unemployment using Portuguese data. They found that although the use of social
networks is more popular as a job search method, it has no significant effect on the probability
of getting out of unemployment. The authors then deduced that sometimes, social networks can
be under- or over-utilized, leading to market inefficiency. Cahuc and Fontaine (2002) provided a
simple matching model in which unemployed workers and employers could be matched together
through social networks and more (costly) efficient methods. They showed that in a decentralized
equilibrium, social networks can be over-or under-utilized. Clearly, there is no consensus about
whether the use of social networks matters or not in the process of getting the job.
However, despite this growing literature, not much is known about low income countries in
general, and Cameroon in particular. This paper aims to fulfill this gap by addressing whether the
use of informal contacts (friends and relatives) influences the probability of exiting unemployment
in Cameroon. Our empirical investigations uses the Weibull-type discrete time duration model. The
novelty of our analysis lies in its attempt to deal with both endogeneity and selection biases. Most
of the literature mentioned above focus on only the endogeneity bias. This paper is the first that
targets both problems simultaneously. We have developed statistical tools to reinforce our analysis.
In this vein, we propose a procedure for selecting strong and valid instruments by resorting to Stock
and Yogo (2005)’s weak instruments test, and Sargan and J tests for overdentification restrictions.
Our results clearly indicate that endogeneity and sample selection biases are issues which need to
be corrected. We then propose a three-step procedure which allows us to deal with both problems.
We find that the use of social networks (friends and relatives) is effective in the process of getting
out of unemployment and that unemployment exhibits a positive duration dependence in Cameroon.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework.
Section 3 details the model for Cameroon. Section 4 presents the estimations, and the conclusions
are drawn in Section 5.
2. General framework
We consider the following discrete time duration model of unemployment governed by the Weibull
type-distribution with density:
f(ti) = 

i t
 1exp[ (it) ]; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N ; (2.1)
where Ti is a random variable that measures the duration of unemployment of individual i,
i  i() = exp[mi()]; mi() is a function of both structural parameters  and individual
characteristics such as age, sex, marital status and variables related to the use of social networks in
the job search process(friends and relatives), and  > 0 is a constant. Then, the Weibull hazard and
survival functions associated with (2.1) are given by:
hi(t) = t
 1exp[mi()] ; (2.2)
Si(t) = expf texp[mi()]g; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N : (2.3)
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where  is an unknown coefficient and exp(:) refers to the exponential function. The hazard rate in
(2.2) is decomposed into a baseline component that depends only on t, h0(t) = t 1 and a second
term exp[mi()] that is parameterized as a function of covariates only.
Define
"i =
1

[ln(ti) +mi()]; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N ; (2.4)
where "i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N are error terms and  1 = . So, (2.4) can be reformulated as:
ln(ti) =  mi() + "i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N ; (2.5)
If "i; are independent of mi() for i = 1; 2; : : : ; N; then we can show that the "i have the prob-
ability density given by f("i) = exp("i   e"i); i.e. the "i are type 1 extreme value errors. But
this property does not hold if "i are correlated with mi(): Furthermore, under (2.5), the probability
density of yi = ln(ti) is f(yi) =  1f("i). We can then estimate model (2.5) instead of (2.2).
In the literature, three specifications are often used for modeling duration: parametric, semi-
parametric and non parametric. Although the semi-parametric specification seems to be more
widely used in empirical work, we choose the specification (2.1) since it is a relatively simple
way to capture duration dependence. For example, it allows us to test for duration dependence [ see
Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2004)] and introduces heterogeneity between individuals through
their own characteristics. If  = 1 in (2.2), the Weibull distribution reduces to exponential one and
the hazard only depends on individual characteristics over time. If  > 1, the hazard monotoni-
cally increases with t and unemployment exhibits a positive duration dependence. The intensity of
this dependence however, varies between individuals. Hence, the probability of exiting unemploy-
ment increases with time spent in unemployment, but its marginal effects vary between individuals.
For example, if two individuals i and j have similar characteristics but different ages, they should
have different probabilities of exiting unemployment. Finally, if  < 1, the hazard monotonically
decreases.
Suppose that we have the estimates of  and ; say ^ and ^: Then, the hazard function can be
estimated by h^i(t) = ^ t^ 1exp[^mi(^)]; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N: The question is how to estimate  and
 consistently. Usually, the maximum likelihood (ML) method is applied for the estimation. How-
ever, this method produces inconsistent estimates if the "i are correlated with mi(): In our case,
assuming the exogeneity of mi() is problematic. Hence, the ML procedure needs to be reinforced.
According to the literature related to social networks and labor markets [Holzer (1988), Addison
and Portugal (2001) and Mouw (2003)], the choice of using the social networks [which is part of
mi()] in getting a job is endogenous. Many factors may explain this endogeneity, notably, location,
gender and matrimonial status. To estimate  and  consistently, one can resort to the instrumental
variables (IV) method. To use the IV method, we must find suitable instruments (valid and strong)
for the measure of the use of social networks (friends and relatives). If the available instruments are
strong, the endogeneity bias problem can be solved. Statistical difficulties however, arise when the
available instruments are weak, i.e. poorly correlated with the (supposedly) endogenous regressors.
It is well known in econometrics that when instruments are weak, IV method produces biased and
inconsistent estimates and standard test procedures, like Wald, Student t, Lagrange multiplier and
Likelihood ratio, become unreliable [see Dufour (1997, 2003), Staiger and Stock (1997), Wang and
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Zivot (1998), Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox (1996), Hall and Peixe
(2003), Doko and Dufour (2008)].
Moreover, even though the endogeneity bias can be dealt with by resorting to the IV method,
another source of endogeneity unfortunately arises from sample selection. Indeed, the use of friends
and relatives is only observed for peoples who have a job or are looking for a job. This leads to
sample censoring, and hence strong evidence of sample selection bias. To avoid this problem, we
propose a three-step estimation procedure (see Section 3.2 for further details). To our knowledge,
this paper is the first which attempts to challenge simultaneously both: endogeneity and sample
selection biases. Standard job search models often focus on the endogeneity bias, ignoring the issue
related to sample selection.
Section 3 details the specification of our model for Cameroon, the choice of instruments and the
methodology of estimation.
3. Model for Cameroon
This section specifies the model for Cameroon, discusses the choice of instruments and the method-
ology of estimation that is proposed.
3.1. Specification and choice of instruments
We consider the following specification of model (2.5):
ln(ti) =  0   1Pareli  
kX
j=2
Xijj + "i; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N ; (3.1)
where for all j = 1; : : : ; k; Parel is a binary variable (supposedly endogenous) that measures
the use of social network (friends and relatives) in the process of job search , X is the matrix of
individual characteristics given by:
X = [Schg; Schte; Age; Sex; Mar; Prim; Ass; Parel.Age; Parel.Sex; Parel:Schg; Parel:Schte] ;(3.2)
where Age is the age of the individual at the time of survey, Schg refers to secondary education
(general) and Schte refers to secondary education (technical), Sex is the sex, which takes 1 if i
is a man and 0 otherwise, Mar refers to marital status, which takes 1 if i is married (including
monogamous) and 0 otherwise, Ass refers to association membership, which takes 1 if i belongs
to an association and 0 otherwise, Prim refers to primary education, and j ; j = 0; : : : ; 11; are
unknown coefficients to be estimated. From ( 3.1), the hazard function (2.2) is now:
hi(t) = t
 1exp[(0 + 1Pareli +
kX
j=2
Xijj)]; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N ; (3.3)
To deal with the endogeneity of Parel, the following instruments are suggested according to the
literature:
Z = [Prot; Fwk; Mst; Dst; Fst] : (3.4)
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The variable Prot takes 1 if i is a Protestant and 0 otherwise, Fwk refers to father’s work and takes
1 if the father of i has a job and 0 otherwise, Mst takes 1 if the mother of the job seeker is a senior
executive and 0 otherwise, Dst is the density of the west native population in the center, and Fst
takes 1 if the father of the job seeker is a senior executive and 0 otherwise. The choice of Prot as
an instrument is justified by the fact that church membership more often implies the possibility of
benefit from the support of the community via a financial or social assistance. This view is supported
by Weber (1905), Hansen and Hansen (2008) and Ndongo, Ebene and Tegnerowicz (2006) in the
context of Cameroon. The variables Fwk, Mst and Fst are related to the status of the job seeker’s
parents’ employment. These variables are often quoted in the literature as proxies of social capital
[see for example Coleman (1988, 1990)]. The variable Dst is used as an instrument of the measure
of the use of social network in Wahba and Zenou (2004). Since all these instruments except Dst
are binary, they may be weak, hence poorly correlated with Parel. In this case, the parameter will
be weakly identified and the estimates biased. We use the weak instruments test proposed by Stock
and Yogo (2005) to access whether these instruments are strong or not. Our results are presented in
Table 1.
Table 1. Test for weak instruments
Instruments Cragg & Donald Wald-F-Statistic Critical value IV size of relative bias
Dst&Fst 15.07 16.38 10%
Dst 22.84 8.96 15 %
Fst 1.71 6.66 20 %
Mst 0.001 5.53 25 %
Fwk 0.95
Prot 3.34
Note: instrument is weak if the Cragg & Donald statistic is below the critical value according to the IV size of relative bias.
Excepting the density of the west native population in the center of Cameroon (here Dst) and
the combination of Dst with the father’s occupational status (Fst), the Stock and Yogo (2005) test
does not reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments for the other IVs. Since there is only one
endogenous variable, we are able to identify model parameters. The Sargan and J tests for over-
dentification restrictions confirmed that the above instruments are valid. The p-value of both tests
is as great as 0.97, indicating that the null hypothesis of overdentification restrictions could not be
rejected. We now discuss the estimation methodology to overcome both endogeneity and sample
selection biases.
3.2. Estimation methodology and Data source
This section explains our estimation methodology and describes the source of the data used. As
mentioned in the previous section, there are two problems that can introduce biases. The first is due
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to the endogeneity of Parel and the second, the way the sample is selected (non-randomly). To deal
with both problems, we propose the following three step-procedure:
Step 1
We estimate a job search model and recover the predicted values of the inverse Mills Ratio IMRp:
The Job search model is specified as:
Ljobi = 0 +
7X
j=1
Xijj +
5X
m=1
Zimm + vi ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N ; (3.5)
where Ljobi is a binary variable that takes 1 if the individual has been looking for a job or have been
working at least one week before the survey, Xij ; j = 1; : : : ; 7 are the first seven variables in X
(where covariates are excluded), Zim; m = 1; : : : ; 5 are the excluded instruments, vi are the error
terms and j ; j = 1; : : : ; 7; m; m = 1; : : : ; 5 are unknown coefficient to be estimated. Since
the dependent variable Ljob is binary, we use a probit for (3.5) that we compare with the linear
probability method. The inverse Mill ratio is then recovered by:
IMRpi =
(^0 +
P7
j=1Xij ^j +
P5
m=1 Zim^m)
(^0 +
P7
j=1Xij ^j +
P5
m=1 Zim^m)
; i = 1; : : : ; N; (3.6)
where ^ = (^j)j=0; :::; 7; and ^ = (^m)m=1; :::; 5; are the maximum likelihood estimates of ; (:)
refers to the density of a standardized normal distribution while (:) is its cumulative function.
Step 2
We estimate the model of the use of social network (friends and relatives) by introducing IMRp as
additional explanatory variable to correct the sample selection bias (if any). The model is specified
explicitly as:
Pareli = 0 +
11X
j=1
Xijj +
5X
m=1
Zimm + IMRpi+ ui ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N ; (3.7)
whereX is the included instruments and Z the excluded instruments. Again, the dependent variable
Parel is binary. Then, we use the probit estimation that we compare with OLS (linear probabilities).
The predictions for Parel are recovered by:
Parelpi = ^0 +
11X
j=2
Xij ^j +
5X
m=2
Zim^m + IMRpi^ ; i = 1; 2; : : : ; N : (3.8)
Step 3
Finally, we replace Parel by Parelp in model (3.1) and estimate it by the maximum likelihood (ML)
using (2.5) which is an equivalent formulation of model (2.1). The log-likelihood of the model is
then given by:
L (;  j ~X) =
NX
i=1
ln[f(yi)] =
NX
i=1
fln() +  [ln(ti) +mi()]  exp [(ln(ti) +mi())]g ;
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mi() = 0 + 1Parelpi +
kX
j=2
Xijj ;  = 
 1; ~X = [Parelp; X] : (3.9)
The maximization problem is maxf; gL (;  ; ~X) with respect to  and  . The first order condi-
tions of this problem are given by:
@L
@
j(^;^) =
NX
i=1
h
1  exp

^mi(^)

t^i
i
~Xi = 0 (3.10)
@L
@
j(^;^) =
N
^
+
NX
i=1
h
1  exp

^mi(^)

t^i
i
[ln(ti) +mi(^)] = 0 ; (3.11)
=
N
^
+
NX
i=1
ln(ti)
h
1  exp

^mi(^)

t^i
i
= 0 ; (3.12)
where ~Xi = [Parelpi; Xi] and mi() = ~Xi: Note that (3.12) holds because (3.10) implies thatPN
i=1
h
1  exp

^mi(^)

t^i
i
mi(^) = 0: We have used Stata 11.1 to solve the problem. The
details of the results are presented in the next section.
The data used are drawn from the Youth Labor Market Incorporation Survey (EDIJ). This survey
is carried out annually among the youth in the city of Yaounde´, Cameroon. The 2008 survey was
conducted among 1924 youths. In this survey, eight categories of job search were considered:
direct application by unemployed workers to firms, informal methods (friends and relatives), self
employment, use of a public employment agency, use of a private employment agency, state hiring,
and a residual group (other methods). Additional information drawn from the survey included
variables such as sex, age, marital status, father and mother employment tenure, wage, region of
residence, and religion.
4. Estimation and results
This section presents our results following the three-step procedure describes in the previous sec-
tion. The section is organized into three subsections. The first provides descriptive statistics and
stylized facts of job search in Cameroon. The second estimates the job search and use of social net
work (friends and relatives) models. Finally, the third estimates the duration model. Section 4.1
summarize some descriptive statistics and stylized facts.
4.1. Descriptive statistics and stylized facts
This section presents some descriptive statistics and stylized facts related to the job search process
and the use of social networks in Cameroon. Table 2 contains the distribution of employed and
unemployed workers by job search method from 2001 to 2008. We note that the use of friends and
relatives to find a job has increased. 41.5% of unemployed workers have used informal contacts
(friends and relatives) when looking for a job. This proportion was 35% in 2001, 43% in 2005 and
60% in 2008. Note that the 60% in 2008 is for Yaounde´ only. Moreover, 41% of employed workers
have declared that they found their job through friends and relatives. This proportion is relatively
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high compared with other job search methods.
Table 2. Search methods among employed and unemployed, 2001-2008: in percentage
Job Search Method Unemployed Employed
2001 2005 2006 2008-Yaounde´ only 2008
Direct application 42 24 34 10 11.42
Parents and relatives 35 43 28 60 41
Public agency 7 2 11 — —
Private agency 6 .12 4 0 5.71
State selection 8 5 7 0 12.85
Self-employment — — 2 5 19
Other 2 1 9 — 3
No mean 18 —
Source : INS-Cameroon.
We also compared the use of friends and relatives as a job search method between women and
men, as seen in Table 3. In general, women used informal contacts (friends and relatives) more
often than men. The proportions were 36.9% and 46.3% for women compared with 38.9% and 31%
for men, in 2005 and 2007 respectively.
Table 3. Search methods among employed and unemployed by sex, 2005-2007: in percentage
Job Search Method Women Men
2005 2007 2005 2007
Direct application 7.3 12.2 28.4 45.5
Parents and relatives 36.9 46.3 38.9 31
Public agency .9 1 5.9 8.7
Private agency .1 .2 5.2 6.4
State selection 5.4 9 10.2 6.2
other including Self-employment .7 1 1.6 .8
Source : INS-Cameroon.
Table 4 presents the Kaplan-Meier non parametric survival and smoothed hazard estimates by
job search methods. We note that the estimated survival curves for all search methods decline
rapidly at first and then decline slowly. Furthermore, except for private competition, the estimated
survival curves seem homogenous for other search methods. The survival hazard estimated is low
for direct application and high for private application compared to other methods. Which means
that the probability of exiting unemployment between t and t + 1 is low for direct application and
high for private application, compared to other methods including informal contacts. As we can
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see, the smooth hazard curve for informal contacts (friends and relatives) begins to increase after
ten time periods. This suggests that the probability of exiting unemployment using this channel is
not negligible.
Table 4. Kaplan Meir survival an hazard functions
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To confirm whether there is a difference between survival and hazard functions among all search
methods, we have used the Fleming and Harrington (1982) test [see Table 5].
Table 5. Fleming-Harrington Test for Equality of Survivor Functions
Job Search Method Events Observed Events Expected Sum of Log Ranks
Direct application 93 93.42 0.510
Social network 270 273.83 0.694
Public and private agency 16 15.42 0.750
Private competition 51 40.41 2.596
State selection and other 44 47.24 -0.892
Self employment 109 112.28 -3.660
Prob > 2 0.06 0.06 0.06
Total 583 583.00 0
This test is one of the several non parametric tests that are often used to compare survival func-
tions across experiences [see Mantel and Haenszel (1959, log rank test), Breslow (1970, Wilcoxon-
type test), Peto and Peto (1972), Prentice (1978) and Tarone and Ware (1977)]. We chose this test
because it freely uses the way the weights are chosen for individuals at the failure time. The test
cannot reject the equality of survival functions at the conventional level of 5%, but does at the nom-
inal level greater than 6%. In particular, the equality of survival functions is rejected at 10%. We
now proceed to the parametric estimation in Section 4.2 and 4.3 below.
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4.2. Determinants of Job search and the use of informal contacts
This subsection provides empirical estimates of two models: the job search model described by
(3.5) and the model of the use of informal contacts (friends and relatives) in the job search process
characterized by (3.7). The job search model aims to determine factors that explain labor market
participation in Cameroon, while the second model questions whether the use of social networks in
the process of getting out of unemployment matters. Table 6 present the results of our estimations.
In the first column we report the variables, while in the other columns we report probit and linear
probability estimations for each model. Our results do not vary substantially between probit and
linear probability methods. As mentioned earlier, the estimation of the job search model can help
to deal with selection bias. The selection bias arises because the choice of the sample of individuals
who use social networks is not random. As expected from the labor market literature, the estimates
of the coefficients of age, sex, education are statistically significant even at the 1% level. These
variables positively affect the probability of market participation. For example, we can see from the
linear probability estimates that a one-unit increase in age increases the probability of looking for
a job by 3.2 %. The effects of a secondary technical or primary education on the the probability of
looking for a job is greater than those of a secondary general education. This is justified mainly by
the predominance of informal activities which do not require high skills. Furthermore, membership
to an association also significantly and positively influences the probability of looking for a job.
This result may be justified by the fact that many activities in Cameroon are often initiated by ethnic
groups. These results are confirmed by the marginal effects of individual characteristics presented
in Table 8 in the Appendix.
Moreover, it is important to note that this estimation contributes to correct the endogeneity
bias. Indeed, the inverse Mills ratio is constructed from this estimation and is added as a factor that
determines the use of the social networks. The last two columns of Table 6 provides the results of the
estimation of model (3.7). The mains objective is to deal with the issue related to the endogeneity of
the measure of the use of social networks. Our estimation also aims to reinforce some stylized facts
about the determinants of the choice of using social networks. As above, two methods are provided:
probit and linear probability. As can be seen, the density of the west native population in the
center of Cameroon (here Dst) and the religion (here Protestant) are the only excluded instruments
from (3.1) that determine the use of social networks. The other excluded instruments, such as
characteristics related to parental employment status are weak (i.e. poorly related to the measure of
the use of social networks). The Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument test did not find evidence
of a strong correlation between religion and use of social networks. This is not surprising since this
test is conservative. One explanation of this high correlation is that church membership often implies
the possibility of benefiting from the support of the community via financial or social assistance.
The density of the west native population in the center of Cameroon positively affects the choice
of using social networks. This result is similar to Putnam (2000) and Wahba and Zenou (2004)
who argued that high density living often increases social interaction, network solidarities, and
consequently social networks. Moreover, most of the included instruments (except “sex” whose
coefficient is not significant for both either probit and linear probabilities methods) determine the
use of social networks. We then observe that individuals with high education are less likely to
use social networks than those with low education. This result is confirmed by a t-test for the
equality of the coefficients between primary and secondary general education or between primary
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Table 6. Determinants of job search and use of social networks in Cameroon
Variables job search model use of social networks
Probit Linear Prob Probit Linear Prob
Age 0:100 0:032  0:019 0.004
(0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
Sex 0:35 0:105 -0.090 0.006
(0.074) (0.021) (0.129) (0.049)
Mar 0:049 0.025  0:276 -0.098
(0.119) (0.040) (0.163) (0.060)
Prim 0:809 0:275 0:518 0:269
(0.148) (0.048) (0.198) (0.073)
Schg 0:216 0:0:084 0.214 0:097
(0.091) (0.028) (0.154) (0.058)
Schte 0:496 0:168 0.204 0:125
(0.115) (0.037) (0.184) (0.070)
Ass 0:306 0:095 0:258 0:124
(0.077) (0.025) (0.130) (0.049)
Prot 0:059 0.023 0:347 0:133
(0.088) (0.026) (0.150) (0.056)
Fwk -0.053 -0.016 -0.079 -0.035
(0.079) (0.025) (0.134) (0.050)
Mst -0.03 -0.005 0.141 0.052
(0.122) (0.034) (0.226) (0.086)
Dst  0:086 -0.033 1:100 0:328
(0.187) (0.052) (0.363) (0.112)
Fst 0.038 0.009 0.165 0.067
(0.079) (0.023) (0.142) (0.054)
Constant  3:431  0:613 - -
(0.255) (0.072) - -
IRMp - - 0:234+ 0:248
- - (0.149) (0.056)
Log pseudolikelihood -794.77 – -277.83 -
Prob > 2 0.000 – 0.000 -
R-squared – 0.191 - 0.547
Number of observations 1532 1532 430 430
    p-val < 0:01;   p-val < 0:05;   p-val < 0:1; + p-val < 0:12; and numbers in (:) – robust standard errors.
and secondary technical. This is probably because individuals with primary education in Cameroon
often do not rely heavily on their human capital. So, they prefer to resort to social networks in
order to get a job. The resort to social networks comes as a compensation for a lack of human
capital, mainly in fields where high qualifications are not required. In addition, the inverse Mills
ratio has a positive coefficient [its p-value is 11.6 % for the probit estimation column 2 and 0.00 for
linear probabilities, see Table 6]. This suggests that there is a selection bias that has been corrected.
The marginal effects of all these variables are shown in Table 9 in the Appendix. Section 4.3 now
presents the estimation of the duration model.
4.3. Duration of unemployment in Cameroon
This subsection provides the results from estimation of model (3.1). Three methods are used for
the purpose of comparison. The main method is Weibull as previously explained. The other two
are the standard two stage least squares (2SLS) and ordinary least squares (OLS++). In the Weibull
11
estimation, we distinguish three setups: (i) WI++ where the measure of the use of social networks
(here Parel) is treated as exogenous, (ii) WII1 where Parel is endogenous and is replaced by its
prediction from the probit estimation above, (iii) WII2 whereParel is endogenous and is replaced
by its prediction from the linear probability estimation. For the 2SLS method, we also consider
cases (ii) and (iii) that we have named SII1 and SII2 respectively. Strictly speaking, covering a
large spectrum of methods allows us to widely assess the central question about whether informal
contacts matter or not in the process of exiting unemployment.
Table 7 reports the results. First, we note in setups OLS++ and WI++ where the variable that
measures the use of social networks is treated as exogenous, its coefficient is not statistically signif-
icant. However, when this variable is instrumented, its coefficient becomes statistically significant
and positive at 5% for the Weibull estimation and 10% for the 2SLS estimation. This result under-
scores clearly that endogeneity was an issue that has been corrected. Hence, treating the variable
that measures the use of social networks as exogenous, or not correcting for the sample selection
bias, is misleading. Moreover, since the coefficient of the measure of social networks in the pro-
cess of job search is positive, the hazard decreases with this variable. This means that individuals
who use social networks are likely to exit unemployment earlier than those who do not. This result
confirms our previous stylized facts.
Furthermore, we observe that most individual characteristics such as sex, education, and mem-
bership to an association, do not affect the hazard rate, since their coefficients are not statistically
significant. Clearly, being a woman, highly educated or a member of an association do not provide
any advantage from the use of social networks in finding a job. This result concerning association
membership is a little surprising since in Cameroon the use of social networks seems to be a fact
of clans. The coefficient of age is not significant but we observe that the covariate “age-use of
networks” (here ParelAge) is significant and negative at 10%. Hence the effect of age is capture
by this covariate. Thus, the hazard function decreases with age, indicating that older individuals
are less likely to exit unemployment through social networks. The difficulty that older individuals
face in finding work may be attributed to the restrictive hiring standards of employers due to ob-
jective and discriminatory factors, such as obsolete skills, health problems, loss of motivation, and
discouragement. All these factors may in turn lead to fewer job offers.
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In contrast to sex, education and membership of an association, matrimonial status positively
affect the hazard rate. This suggests that individuals who are not married exit unemployment earlier
than those who are married, through social networks. Furthermore, our results also indicate that
the estimated Weibull parameter ^ = exp(0:297) = 1:35 and the t-test for the null hypothesis
H0 :  = 1 is rejected even at the nominal level 1%. This means that the hazard monotonically
increases with t and unemployment exhibits a positive duration dependence. Again, this result
confirms our previous stylized facts.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined whether the use of social networks (friends and relatives) as a job
search strategy matters in Cameroon. After formulating an empirical framework which allowed
us to address this issue in a convenient way, we showed that the use of social networks (friends
and relatives) is effective in the process of exiting unemployment in Cameroon. More precisely,
individuals who use social networks are likely to exit unemployment earlier than those who do not.
However, individual characteristics such as sex, education, and association membership, have no
effect on the probability of getting a job through social networks. This result concerning association
membership is surprising since the use of social networks seems to be a fact of clans in Cameroon.
In contrast, the hazard function decreases with age indicating that older individuals are less likely
to excite unemployment through social networks. This may be attributed to the restrictive hiring
standards of employers due to objective and discriminatory factors (obsolete skills, health problems,
loss of motivation, and discouragement). In addition, individuals who are not married are likely to
find a job earlier through social networks than those who are married. Furthermore, our results
indicate that the hazard function monotonically increases with time and unemployment exhibits a
positive duration dependence.
This paper also provides an analysis of factors that determine labor market participation and
the use of social networks. We find that the density of the west native population in the center of
Cameroon and religion (Protestant) are the only factors that determine the use of social networks.
In contrast, individual characteristics such as age, sex, education, membership to an association,
determine labor market participation.
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APPENDIX
Table 8. Marginal effects after probit: Determinants of labor market participation
y = Pr(Ljob) (predict)= .280
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P > jzj [ 95% C.I. ] Mean
Age 0.034 0.003 11.060 0.000 0.028 0.040 23.306
Sex* 0.117 0.025 4.780 0.000 0.069 0.165 0.514
Prim* 0.306 0.057 5.330 0.000 0.193 0.418 0.082
Schg* 0.073 0.031 2.360 0.018 0.012 0.133 0.465
Schte* 0.180 0.044 4.100 0.000 0.094 0.266 0.152
Mar* 0.017 0.041 0.410 0.683 -0.063 0.096 0.142
Ass* 0.106 0.027 3.880 0.000 0.052 0.160 0.316
Mst* -0.010 0.041 -0.250 0.806 -0.090 0.070 0.101
Fwk* -0.018 0.027 -0.670 0.506 -0.070 0.035 0.659
Prot* 0.020 0.030 0.670 0.502 -0.039 0.079 0.217
Fst* 0.013 0.027 0.480 0.630 -0.040 0.065 0.311
Dst* -0.028 0.060 -0.470 0.637 -0.145 0.089 0.050
Table 9. Marginal effects after probit: Determinants of the use of informal contacts
y = Pr(Parel) (predict)= .508
Variables dy/dx Std. Err. z P > jzj [ 95% C.I. ] Mean
Age -0.008 0.003 -2.410 0.016 -0.014 -0.001 26.840
Sex* -0.036 0.051 -0.700 0.486 -0.137 0.065 0.605
Prim* 0.200 0.072 2.790 0.005 0.059 0.341 0.144
Schg* 0.085 0.061 1.390 0.164 -0.035 0.205 0.372
Schte* 0.081 0.072 1.120 0.265 -0.061 0.223 0.177
Mar* -0.110 0.064 -1.710 0.087 -0.236 0.016 0.284
Ass* 0.103 0.051 2.010 0.045 0.002 0.203 0.435
Mst* 0.056 0.089 0.630 0.532 -0.119 0.231 0.091
Fwk* -0.032 0.053 -0.590 0.552 -0.136 0.073 0.563
Prot* 0.137 0.058 2.370 0.018 0.024 0.250 0.228
Fst* 0.066 0.056 1.170 0.241 -0.044 0.176 0.298
Dst* 0.370 0.085 4.370 0.000 0.204 0.536 0.049
IMRP 0.093 0.059 1.570 0.116 -0.023 0.209 0.902
(*) - dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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